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Abstract  This paper provides an overview of the evolution of the harmonization 
process of European law in the field of group of companies, referring to the development 
of a national “group of companies law” — from the company law reform to the crisis 
and insolvency code — with the purpose of examining the main aspects of the regulation 
in force, considering mainly the possible interaction with the rules on the crisis of the 
groups of companies introduced by the Legislative Decree No. 14/2019, and with the 
aim of analyzing its suitability for being devoted to the prospect of harmonization across 
countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent introduction in the Italian legal system of provisions regarding the 
insolvency of corporate groups (contained in the “Codice della crisi d’impresa e 
dell’insolvenza,” which is “Code of the Business Crisis and Insolvency” or “CCII/Crisis  
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Code” for short),
1
 which will fully come into force on August 15, 2020) suggests that a 
second examination of the topic of corporate groups should be conducted, both at a 
national and a European level. At a European level, as well known, the crises of corporate 
groups are disciplined by the EU Regulation 848/2015, applicable in Italy since 2017, 
which governs cross-border bankruptcy procedures. From this Regulation, we can deduce 
a concept of corporate groups that is not identical to the one that can be extracted from 
varied Italian legal dispositions. In fact, the Regulation defines a corporate group by 
referring to the holding company as the “parent corporation” and to the subsidiary 
companies, which are directly or indirectly controlled, as “daughter companies” (i.e. 
subsidiaries). To put it simply, the European notion of a corporate group is based on a 
hierarchical model that tracks the activity of direction and coordination by the “parent 
company” with regard to the subsidiary corporations, apparently excluding all those forms of 
aggregation based on a lesser degree of control or a merely “factual connection.”
2
 
The criterion with which to pinpoint the holding company is the drafting of a 
consolidated financial statement, compliant with EU principles.
3
 The new European legal 
discipline was introduced with the objective of filling any loopholes inside Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000, which was in force for over a decade and did not provide a 
specific discipline for cross-border bankruptcy of corporate groups; the new discipline has 
the merit “of allowing member States to acquire the regulatory discipline, under the 
procedural and formal point of view, even with some critical points, stemming especially 
from the nebulous definition section and gaps in the discipline of corporate groups.”
4
 
                                                      
1 On the impact of the Crisis Code on the structure and legal discipline of groups see: Giuliana 
Scognamiglio, I gruppi di imprese nel CCII: fra unità e pluralità (Corporate Groups in the CCII: Between 
Unity and Plurality), 2 Le Società (Company Review), 413 (2019). The Italian legislator chose the term 
“crisis” so as to include a wider notion than just that of insolvency, thus including, e.g. the notion of “lack of 
liquidity,” able to cause the “crisis” of the company, even if not necessarily its bankruptcy (let us e.g. think 
about a company with no liquidity, but with assets that, if liquidated with enough time at disposal, would 
cover for corporate debts). 
2 Gabriela Fierbinteanu, Groups of Companies in Insolvency Proceeding, 2 Lex ET Scientia International 
Journal, 1(2014); Lorenzo Benedetti, I flussi informativi nella crisi di gruppo (Informations in Group Crisis), 
1 Giurisprudenza Commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 271 (2017); Daniele Vattermoli, Gruppi 
multinazionali insolventi (Multinational Groups in Insolvency), 1 Rivista di Diritto Commerciale 
(Commercial Law Review), 588 (2013). 
3 The EU Regulation sets forth types of cooperation and communication between insolvency procedures 
pending in different member states and contemplates the faculty to request the opening of a coordinated 
insolvency procedure for a corporate group with the appointment of a coordinator and the layout of a plan, as 
well as the possibility of requesting the suspension of asset liquidation in a procedure open to all companies 
of the group. This discipline follows the UNCITRAL Model Law and is inspired by the separate entity 
approach shared by European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisprudence. 
4 Giuseppina Graci, UE e disciplina dell’insolvenza (II parte) – Le procedure d’insolvenza delle società 
facenti parte di un gruppo di società (EU and Insolvency Law (Part II) — The Insolvency Procedures of 
Companies Belonging to a Group of Companies), 2 Giurisprudenza Italiana (Italian Jurisprudence Review), 
480 (2018), in which it is observed that “the absence of a statutory discipline has meant that in many 
occasions the European Court of Justice has had to perform the laborious task of reconstructing certain 
cardinal principles which can be applied to corporate groups, because routine procedure has shown that the 
majority of cases that it has tackled regarded insolvency procedures (especially reconstruction procedures of 
one or more components of a stable group of corporations).” 
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At a national level, the legal discipline of the “extraordinary administration” of 
corporate groups (Articles 80, et al. of Legislative Decree No. 270/1999, which extended 
to banks and insurance companies by Articles 98 and 105 through the Italian Banking 
Consolidated Act) that contained measures for industrial reconstruction and the 
management of large businesses in a state of insolvency (the so-called special procedure 
for immediate admission) was introduced by Legislative Decree No. 347/2003 (which 
was later converted to Legislative Decree No. 39/2004). As authoritative scholars have 
said, this legislation introduced the idea that a preventive control system for corporate 
crisis must take corporate group dimensions into account.
5
 
In this panorama, the Crisis Code, enacted by Legislative Decree No. 14/2019 of 
February 14, 2019, to replace the previous Italian Bankruptcy Law, fills the gaps and 
introduces a comprehensive discipline for the economic crises of corporate groups 
(Articles 284–292 of the CCII). The new statutory instrument is to be welcomed because 
it introduces the legislative emersion of this phenomenon. However, it refrains from a 
unitary definition of the latter (it merely recalls the criteria of direction and coordination 
set forth by Article 2497 of the Civil Code and the presumption of the existence of such 
activities in any case in which there is a company that has to present a consolidated 
financial statement). The legislator, when reforming the Civil Code, followed the 
substantial and procedural lines contained in Article 3 of Law No. 155/2017, which takes 
into account the unitary nature of a group-crisis or group-insolvency, maintaining the 
principle of independence of active and passive assets of the corporate group, as well as 
the legal autonomy of each company belonging to it. 
The exact basis of the distinction and separation of the assets (both active and passive)  
                                                      
5 Paolo Montalenti, Amministrazione e controllo nella società per azioni: riflessioni sistematiche e 
proposte di riforma (Control and Administration in the Italian Public Companies: Systematic Reflections and 
Reform Proposals), 1 Rivista delle società (Company Law Review), 42 (2013). Regarding group insolvency, 
see Stefano Poli, Il concordato preventivo di gruppo (The Group Agreement with Creditors), 4 
Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 735 (2014); Sido Bonfatti, L’amministrazione 
straordinaria delle banche e dei gruppi bancari (The Special Administration of Banks and Bank Groups), 1 Il 
nuovo diritto delle società (The New Company Law), 115 (2014); A. Pessina e C. Pessina, Amministrazione 
straordinaria delle grandi imprese insolventi: il concordato (The Special Administration of Big Companies in 
Insolvency: The Agreement), 1 Il nuovo diritto delle società (The New Company Law), 65 (2013); Alida 
Paluchowsky, L’insolvenza dei gruppi tra tutela della personalità giuridica ed artifici virtuosi (The Groups 
Insolvency between Legal Entity Protection and Virtuous Artifices), 1 Il nuovo diritto delle società (The New 
Company Law), 97 (2014); Fabrizio Guerrera, Note critiche sulla cd. supersocietà e sull’estensione del 
fallimento in funzione repressiva dell’abuso di direzione unitaria (Notes on the So-Called Supersociety and 
the Extension of the Failure Procedures in Order to Repress the Abuse of Unitary Management), 1 Diritto del 
Fallimento (Insolvency Law Review), 63 (2014); Luciano Panzani, La disciplina della crisi di gruppo tra 
proposte di riforma e modelli internazionali (Group Crisis Discipline between Reform Proposals and 
International Models), 9 Il Fallimento (Insolvency Review), 1153 (2016); Federica Pasquariello, Italian 
Bankruptcy Code Moving — Toward a Reform Era, 2 Diritto del Fallimento (Insolvency Law Review), 347 
(2016).  
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of each company that is part of the group has always created significant inconsistencies.
6
 
A testament to this is the recent debate in jurisprudence about the possibility or not to 
configure, even without formal legal rules, a joint request to be admitted to a bankruptcy 




Jurisprudence has often found itself struggling with the topic of procedural profiles of 
groups, treating a joint bankruptcy request as a series of separate procedures, with a 
certain connection, defined as “weak consolidation.”
8
 Even when lower courts tried to 
modify their perspective, the Court of Cassation found a joint agreement unacceptable. 
According to the Supreme Court (i.e. the Italian Court of Cassation), a different solution 
would spark confusion between the assets of the companies, favoring the creditors of one 
of these, and could not be justified, not even in the light of the theory of “compensational 
advantages.” This has its “acid test” solely in the domain of liability of the holding 
company and is not extendable to the sector of economic crisis. In this sense, a confusion 
of the assets is opposed by the court because it is deemed damaging to all the creditors 
involved, whose interests are considered more important than those of the investors 
during bankruptcy, and would also conflict with the principles found in Article 2740 of 
Civil Code on debtor liability.
9 
                                                      
6 See Scognamiglio, fn. 1; Alessandro Nigro, Il “diritto societario della crisi”: nuovi orizzonti? (The 
“Corporate Law of Crisis”: New Frontiers?), 12 Rivista delle società (Company Law Review), 1207 (2018); 
Oreste Cagnasso, Il diritto societario della crisi tra passato e futuro (The Corporate Law of Crisis from Past 
to the Future), 1 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 33 (2017); Giovanni Lo Cascio, 
Il codice della crisi di impresa e dell’insolvenza: considerazioni a prima lettura (Code of Business Crisis and 
Insolvency: First-Read Considerations), 1 Il Fallimento (Insolvency Review), 34 (2019); Alessandro Fosco 
Fagotto, La rilevanza dei gruppi imprese alla luce del nuovo CCII (The Relevance of Corporate Groups in 
Light of the New CCII), available at www.dirittobancario.it (last visited Sep. 5, 2019). The Italian statutory 
discipline appears to be similar to the one introduced in Spain with the Ley Concursal, which contemplates a 
joined declaration of bankruptcy and the unification of insolvency procedures without the consolidation of the 
assets of the single corporations.   
7 Corte di Appello di Genova, Dec. 23, 2011, 2 Il Fallimento (Insolvency Review), 358 (2012); Mario 
Sandulli, Commento sub art. 160 l. fall. (Comments on Art. 160 in the Bankruptcy Law), in Alessandro Nigro 
& Mario Sandulli, La riforma della legge fallimentare (The Reform of Bankruptcy Law), Giappichelli 
(Torino), 284 (2006). 
8 Tribunale di Roma, Jul. 25, 2012, 4 Il Fallimento (Insolvency Review), 748 (2013); Tribunale di 
Palermo, Jun. 4, 2014, 5 Il Fallimento (Insolvency Review), 941 (2014). 
9 See Corte di Cassazione, Oct. 13, 2015, No. 20559, 3 Giurisprudenza Italiana (Italian Iurisprudence 
Review), (2016), commented by Alfredo Di Majo, Il fenomeno del concordato cd. di gruppo e il diniego 
espresso dalla Corte di Cassazione (The Phenomenon of the Group Agreement and the Negative Decision of 
the Court of Cassation); Corte di Cassazione, Jul. 31, 2017, No. 19014, 11 Società (Company Review), 1386 
(2017), commented by  Giuseppe Fauceglia; Corte di Cassazione, Oct. 17, 2018, No. 26005, 2 Il Fallimento 
(Insolvency Review), 489 (2019), commented by Lorenzo Benedetti. For an overview of the rich 
jurisprudence, see Stefano Poli, Il concordato di gruppo: II verifica critica degli approdi giurisprudenziali 
(The Group Agreement: Critical Review of Jurisprudence), 1 Contratto e impresa (Contract and Company 
Review), 100 (2015); Marco Maugeri, Gruppo insolvente e competenza territoriale (Insolvent Group and 
Territorial Jurisdiction), 1 Banca borsa e titoli di credito (Bank Law Review), 22 (2018). For criticism of the 
theory proposed by the Italian Supreme Court, see Umberto Tombari, Crisi di impresa e doveri di “corretta 
gestione societaria e imprenditoriale” della società capogruppo (Corporate Crisis and Duties of “Correct 
Corporate and Business Management” of the Parent Company), 3 Rivista diritto commerciale (Commercial 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL DISCIPLINE OF GROUPS,  
AT NATIONAL AND EU LEVELS 
A corporate group, which can assume many different forms and interests, and many 
different business realities with different dimensions, can be placed within the area of 
connections and cooperation among enterprises, articulated in different ways according to the 
different economic and legal contexts in which they work. However, the group distinguishes 
itself in such a context because of its compactness. In such a context, interests are multiplied, 
the concept of “monad company” cannot be considered universal, and belonging to a specific 
group is considered ever more a normal condition of economic reality. 
At a European level, studies to harmonize legislation of member states in the sector of 
corporate groups go back to the 1960s. After the first draft Directive on groups in 1975, 
which attracted much criticism because it was too restrictive and unfavorable to the 
discipline of “strategies,” the Ninth Directive was introduced in December 1984. This was 
inspired by theories on group directives, the admissibility of an influence on subsidiary 
companies motivated by group interest, the possibility to legitimize a compensational logic, 
and the recognition of group regulations and agreements.
10
 In addition, the Ninth Directive 
was also inspired by German legislation, which was again the object of discussions (which 
were initially quite common and then progressively diluted even if, periodically, they 
resurfaced) and, yet, to this day, it has never been translated into a proposal for the 
European Commission. Originally, as stated in the 1985 White Book of the Commission, 
the drafting of a uniform legal discipline for corporate groups had assumed a preeminent 
position within the framework of EU policies, both with the prospect of economic and 




                                                                                                                                                    
Law Review), 631 (2011). 
10 See the text in 12 Le Società (Company Review), 1987, 1308 ff. (with comments by Antonio Pavone 
La Rosa, Osservazioni sulla proposta di Nona Direttiva sui gruppi di società (Observation on the Proposal of 
the Ninth Directive on Company Groups), 4 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 831 
(1986), and by Klaus J. Hopt, L’armonisation de droit des groups des sociétées. La proposition d’une 
Directive de la Commission de la C.E.E. (Law Harmonization of Company Groups. The Proposal of Directive 
by C.E.E. Commission), 7 Giurisprudenza Commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 846 (1986). For a 
reconstruction of the debate by legal scholars, see Paola Balzarini, Giuseppe Carcano & Federico Mucciarelli, 
I gruppi di società: atti del convegno internazionale di studi: Venezia (Company Groups: Documents from 
International Conference of Studies: Venice), Giuffrè (Milan), at 16–18 (1996), and Corporate Group Law 
for Europe, 1 European Business Organization Law Review, 1 (2000), 2 Rivista delle società (Company Law 
Review), 341 (2001). Cf. Gustavo Minervini, I gruppi di società nella Comunità economica europea. 
Problemi di diritto societario (Corporate Groups in CEE. Problems of the Corporate Law), Cedam (Padua), 
at 22 (1975); Piergiusto Jaeger, I gruppi fra diritto interno e prospettive comunitarie (Corporate Groups 
between Internal Law and International Perspective), 1 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial 
Jurisprudence), 91 (1981); La Rosa, Id. at 931; Agostino Gambino, I gruppi in Italia alla luce del progetto di 
IX direttiva (Corporate Groups in Italy Considering the Draft of Ninth Directive), 1 Giurisprudenza  
commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 5 (1987); Alessandro Cerrai, I gruppi di imprese nell’esperienza 
giuridica europea (Corporate Groups in European Judicial Experience), 2 Rivista delle società (Company 
Law Review), 432 (1995).  
11 On this point, see M. Rondinelli, Il processo di armonizzazione del diritto societario europeo 
(Harmonization Process of European Corporate Law), in Elisabetta Pederzini, Percorsi di diritto societario 
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Also, the 1984 Project (with no successive drafts), even if inspired by a more modern 
conception of the phenomenon, had certain evident loopholes that presented obstacles to its 
common adoption. The Project was created to “manage corporate groups that had a public 
limited company as a subsidiary entity,”
12
 with an unexplainable and inadequate limit for 
the evolution of economic reality. More generally, it seemed impermeable to diversification 
stemming from the different nature and hetero-direction of groups, where the variety of 
types has always depended both on the number of corporations and the relationship 
between the holding corporation and the companies belonging to the group.
13
 These 
aspects influence profoundly the independence and autonomy of single corporations, the 
legal framework of the group, as well as its “corporate governance.”
14
 
The delay in the process of harmonization in the area of corporate groups inserts itself 
in a legal panorama that is very composite as the German system has been traditionally seen 
as the only one — at least in the beginning — to have a structured legal framework, and 




                                                                                                                                                    
europeo (Aspects of European Corporate Law), Giappichelli (Turin), at 114 (2007); Alberto Santamaria, 
Diritto commerciale europeo (European Commercial Law), Giuffrè (Milan), at 228 (2008). 
12 The project centers on corporate groups in which a public company is a subsidiary, highlighting the 
fact that activities of direction and coordination may damage interests of minority shareholders, employees, 
and creditors of the latter. “[F]or this reason in the draft project of the directive the term ‘public company’ is 
used only in reference to a subsidiary, instead the word ‘company’ is employed with reference to all other 
entities — parent and subsidiaries, etc. belonging to a group.” Rondinelli, Id.  
13 On the heterogeneity of corporate groups in the European system see Johannes Lübking, Konzernrecht 
für Europa (European Corporate Groups), Nomos (Baden-Baden), at 15, 330 (2000).  
14 Stefan Grundmann, European Company Law: Organization, Finance and Capital Markets (2nd 
edition), Intersentia (Cambridge), at 760 (2012); Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Governance in Europe. A Critical 
Review of the European Commission’s Initiatives on Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, European 
Corporate Governance Institute, (2015). For a recent investigation on the general characteristics of the topic 
of European harmonization, see Luca Enriques e Nadia Zorzi, L’armonizzazione europea del diritto degli stati 
membri in materia societaria: profili generali, diritto societario europeo e internazionale (European 
Harmonization of the Right of Member States), in Massimo Benedettelli & Marco Lamandini, Diritto 
societario europeo e internazionale (European and International Corporate Law), Utet (Turin), at 179 (2016).  
15 On the German model see Lydia Bittner, Die Struktur der Unternehmensgruppe im deutschen und 
europäischen Recht (The Structure of Corporate Groups in European and German Law), Nomos 
(Baden-Baden), (2009); Klaus Böhlhoff & Julius Budde, Company Groups — The EEC Proposal for a Ninth 
Directive in the Light of the Legal Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1 Journal of Comparative 
Business and Capital Market Law, 164 (1984); Harald Halbhuber, Neutrale Rhetorik, wertender Gehalt: 
Kommunikationsprobleme in der europäischen Gesellschaftsrechtsharmonisierung am Beispiel des 
Konzernrechts (Problems of Comunication in Corporate Groups Harmonization), 2 Die Zeitschrift für 
Europäisches Privatrecht (The Journal of European Private Law), 236 (2002); Peter Hommelhoff, Klaus J. 
Hopt & Marcus Lutter, Konzernrecht und Kapitalmarktrecht (Corporate and Market Law), Beck (Munich), 
(2001); Klaus J. Hopt , Konzernrecht: Die europäische Perspektive (Corporate Groups: European 
Perspective), 1 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht (Journal of commercial and 
business law) 1 (2007); Klaus J. Hopt, L’harmonisation de droit des group des sociétés. La proposition d’une 
Directive de la Commission de la C.E.E. (Harmonization of the Corporate Law. The Proposal of CEE 
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In this sense, a weak point in the legal discipline of the legislation of the majority of 
member states is the circumstance that companies belonging to a group see different rules 
applied to them, according to whether they are companies with shares listed on the stock 
market or not, or, in any case, according to their legal type and not their belonging to a 
corporate group, or even in the application of the general discipline on corporations without 
any exceptions (except for those stemming from the harmonization of specific sectors).
16
 
Conversely, it is necessary to structure a discipline whose objective is the protection of 
interests that are specifically pertinent to this type of corporate business in a way that is 
independent from the legal structure considered, which focuses on the protection of 
shareholders and creditors and the efficient allocation of decision-making power to different 
boards in companies which are part of the group (in relation to directive power and the 
identification of interests that must be pursued). 
From this point of view, it is suitable to highlight how the French legal thought has 
underestimated the depth of the Italian legal model after the 2005 reform; it is, in fact, 
considered “a regime on liability in group relationships, more specifically on the question 
of to what extent coordination may take place without subjecting the holding company to a 
duty to compensate.”
17
 A few sectorial gaps must be signaled,
18
 as highlighted by the 
Commission of three sectors “requiring special dispositions” (financial and non-financial 
information; the initiation of a group discipline; and company pyramid schemes — a 
peculiar European phenomenon)
 19
 and the Action Plan of 2003, which shows corporate 
                                                                                                                                                    
Directive), 4 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 846 (1986); Hans-Jurgen Hellwig, 
Das deutsche Gesellschaftsrecht und Europa – Ein Appell zu mehr Offenheit und Engagement (German and 
European Corporate Groups), 2 Zeitschrift der Germanisten Rumäniens (Journal of Gemanist in Romania), 
216 (2013).     
16 After the Ninth Directive Proposal, statutes on corporate groups have been enacted in Portugal, 
Slovenia, and Croatia; see Grundmann, fn. 14 at 757. Also a specific discipline on corporate groups has been 
introduced in the Czech Republic (Arts. 71 et al. Law on Companies), see Katerina Eichlerova, Group 
Interest in Czech Republic, 5 Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Legal Studies, 13 (2016), and also in Arts. 3–49 
of the Hungarian Civil Code, see Tekla Papp & Adam Auer, Group Interest in Hungary, 5 Acta Universitatis 
Sapientiae, Legal Studies, 27–46 (2016).  
17 See Grundmann, fn. 14 at 757 (“Though Codified, Resembles more to the Trend in the Case Law in 
France (the so-called Rozenblum doctrine).”). 
18 We are referring to European Legislation No. 435/1990 (modified by European Legislation 123/2003 
and 1998/2006) regarding the tax regime applicable to both parent and subsidiary corporations of different 
member states; to which applies also the Seventh European Legislation on “consolidated accounts,” approved 
in 1983, then modified and replaced by European Legislation No. 34/2003, on Jun. 26, 2013, as well as the 
regulation of corporate operations with connected parties or extraordinary operations, see Grundmann, fn. 14 
at 765. 
19 Corporate pyramids are defined as a chain of corporate participation in which final control is ensured 
through a minimum capital investment, thanks to minority shareholders. These raise numerous problems of 
transparency, especially with regard to public companies. It has thus been recommended that national 
authorities do not admit to the stock exchange corporations belonging to “illegal pyramid structures,” i.e. 
those companies whose main assets are a stock in another public company, with the exception of cases in 
which the economic value of the participation has been clearly proven, taking into consideration floating 
capital as well; see Paolo Montalenti, Sociedades cotizadas, mercados financieros y relaziones con los 
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groups and pyramid structures among areas in need of intervention, without taking into 
account if, in the meantime, the necessary political conditions for the different projects had 
been approved. 
In the last decade, the European debate has been characterized by the absence of a 
strong cultural paradigm that can be used as a reference point, as support for the German 
model waned and no model was thereafter proposed as an alternative. However, it is 
emblematic that the subsequent Action Plan of 2012 (European company law and 
corporate governance — a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and 
sustainable companies), in which the initiatives that must be adopted are set forth in order 




If there is lingering caution about the idea of introducing a uniform discipline on 
corporate groups, we can emphasize the need to guarantee more information on group 
structure and develop the notion of “group interest.” Finally, there is also the need to 
improve transparency and the supervision of operations performed by connected parties 
within the framework of the reform of the directive on shareholder rights. 
These are still generic indications, taken in part from the Green Paper of 2011, which 
identifies its objective as the need to “maintain and enhance the flexibility of management 
of a group in its international business activities.”
21
 The main aims of the Action Plan are, 
in fact, the pursuit of group politics to enhance group interest as well as to increase 
transparency and information requirements. These are the aims — as has been noted — 
partially underlying the Italian legislation; these same aims, at a European level, are not 
declared in a specific way. In fact, a characteristic of this historical period is the absence of 
strong models or ideas in the European debate on corporate groups.
22
 
                                                                                                                                                    
inversores (Listed Companies, Financial Markets and Relationships with Investors), 1 Rivista delle società 
(Company Law Review), 28 (2015); Klaus J. Hopt, Groups of Companies. A Comparative Study on 
Economics, Law and Regulation of Corporate Groups, 1 European Corporate Governance Institute, 11 
(2015).  
20  Action Plan 2012, Rivista di Diritto delle Società (Corporate Law Review), 228 (2013). Cf. 
Piergaetano Marchetti, Il nuovo Action Plan europeo in materia societaria e di corporate governance (The 
New European Action Plan in Corporate Law and Corporate Governance), 1 Rivista delle società (Company 
Law Review), 225 (2013); S. Alvaro & Bruno Lupini, Le linee di azione della Commissione Europea in 
materia di corporate governance e i riflessi sull’ordinamento italiano (Guide Lines of the European 
Commission in Corporate Governance and Its Influence in the Italian System), Quaderni Giuridici Consob 
(Law Editions Consob), Mondadori (Roma), (2013). 
21 Cf. Report of the Reflection Group on the future of EU Company Law, 8 Rivista di Diritto delle società 
(Corporate Law Review), 751 (2011); Francesco Chiappetta & Umberto Tombari, “Report on the future of EU 
Company Law”: una breve introduzione (“Report on the future of EU Company Law”: A Brief Overview), 8 
Rivista di Diritto delle società (Corporate Law Review), 746 (2013). 
22 Cf. Umberto Tombari, Il “diritto dei gruppi”: primi bilanci e prospettive per il legislatore comunitario 
(“The Law of Groups”: First Considerations and Perspectives for European Legislator), in Vv. AA., Il diritto 
societario riformato: bilancio di un decennio e prospettive in un quadro europeo (The Reformed Corporate 
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There was hope that the EU Parliament Resolution of 14 June 2012, on the future of 
company law, in its indication of the Ninth Directive as one of the short-term objectives, 
could have been a partial inversion of this trend, but it was not so.
23
 Of interest in this 
alternating context (as investigated in published reports on information flows of group 
interest and liability) is the recent European Model Company Act (EMCA), which was 
presented as a project in September 2015 at the annual conference on company law in 
Vienna and published in its current version in March 2017. This Act, as mentioned in the 
introduction, is a “free standing general company statute that can be enacted by Member 
States or neighboring countries either substantially in its entirety or by the adoption of 
selected provisions,” with the ambitious aim of becoming the basis for a subsequent 
European harmonization. In this important document, the results of the work of important 
scholars in the field of company law of various countries, an entire chapter (Chapter 15) is 
dedicated to corporate groups.
24
 
Without going into detail, it is emblematic that the law on corporate groups by the 
EMCA is inspired by views in part different and revolutionary when compared to both the 
EU approach and the Italian national approach. The declared objective of the model is not 
in fact centered on the protection of subsidiary companies and their minority shareholders 
and creditors but on the identification of rules that can bolster the organization and the 
functioning of this type of corporate organization. 
The independence of this approach emerges from its definitions — where a “group” is 
defined as “the entity comprising the parent company and all its national or foreign 
subsidiaries or entities,” where a “subsidiary” is “a company subject to a direct or indirect 
control, that can be partial or complete, by the parent company,” and where “control” is 
                                                                                                                                                    
Law: Considerations of a Decade and Prospects in the European Context), Atti del Convegno di Courmayeur 
(Courmayeur Convention), Giuffrè (Milan), at 114 (2014), where it was concluded that: “essentially, reading 
the few lines dedicated to corporate groups in the 2012 Action Plan, the strong impression surfaces that they 
have wished to buy time in order to find technical solutions, before political ones, that can be shared.” 
23 Cf. Marchetti, fn. 20 at 227. See Para. 4.6: “The public consultation of 2012 has revealed that the 
general public is in favour of an EU initiative on corporate groups (feedback document of Jul. 17, 2012). Two 
key points have been identified based on the report of the think tank; the parties are in favour of a simplified 
form of communication with investors on group structure and the recognition of a group interest at an EU 
level. On the other hand, the idea of a global European framework on corporate groups has been greeted with 
caution.” 
24  Marco Ventoruzzo, The New European Model Company Act, available at http://corpgov.law. 
harward.edu/2015/10/14 (last visited Sep. 7, 2019); Paul Kruger Andersen, The European Model Company 
Act (EMCA) — A Tool for European Integration, 1 ERA Forum, (2018); Alessio Bartolacelli, Il progetto per 
un European Model Company Act (The Project of a European Model Company Act), in Massimo Benedettelli 
& Marco Lamandini, Diritto societario europeo e internazionale (The European and International Corporate 
Law), Utet (Turin), at 689 (2016); Coutinho De Abreu, The Law of Groups of Companies according to the 
European Model Company Act, 1 Orizzonti del diritto commerciale (Horizons of Commercial Law), 1 (2017). 
On EMCA group and EMCA project, available at http://law.au.dk/en/research/projects/european-model- 
company-act-emca (last visited Jun. 19, 2019). 
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defined as the power of the parent company to “govern, alone or with other shareholders, 
the financial and operating policies of a subsidiary” — and within a framework similar in 
this respect to the Italian legal system that emphasizes a unitary governance, achievable not 
just with participation mechanisms but also with contractual and factual ones, and that is 
simultaneously more aware of the economic reality, recognizing the group as “an entity,” 
while maintaining the independence of the subsidiary companies. 
However, the peculiarity of the EMCA model’s perspective emerges very strongly 
where it gives the parent company the right to impart instructions to the managers of the 
subsidiary corporation, without envisaging, as a counter limit, a specific form of liability. 
As can be read in the accompanying report to the model, the preferred approach has been 
that of considering corporate groups and managerial activities of the parent companies as “a 
reality which has not to be formally legalized or declared.”
25
  
Even though it does not contemplate a special regulation of the parent corporation’s 
liability with regard to the overall management and direction of a group, this model 
identifies a set of mechanisms that aim to protect the subsidiary corporations, their minority 
shareholders and creditors.
26
 Taking into consideration such an innovative approach that is 
projected towards the needs of the companies, it is surprising that this model appears 
oriented only towards public limited companies, underestimating the variety and 
multifaceted nature of corporate groups. 
II. THE “ITALIAN MODEL” BETWEEN A GENERAL LEGAL DISCIPLINE OF CORPORATE 
GROUPS AND SPECIAL REGULATION FOR CRISES 
A. Configuration of the “Group” 
As mentioned above, at a European level, the multitude of definitions of what a 
corporate group is and the absence of coherence are a starting problem common to many 
legal systems. As a matter of fact, “there may indeed be differences only if different aims 
are pursued, but differences in definition really have to be justified by differences of 
                                                      
25 The power to issue directives to the executive officers of a subsidiary encounters two limits: First, 
certain members of the board of directors of subsidiaries are exempt from the obligation of fulfilling the 
instructions imparted (the independent executives and those appointed by employees or those not appointed 
by the parent company); second, executive officers of the subsidiary are compelled to fulfill instructions 
given by the parent company only if they are in compliance with group interest (Section 16, while not 
describing what group interest is, illustrates in detail criteria for the prevailing of group interest over that of 
the single corporation). 
26 As can be read in Section 13, it is provided that the so-called “corporate opportunities” of the 
subsidiary must obtain the approval of independent managers or of the non-controlling shareholders; that the 
shareholders of a subsidiary have power to request inspections of the parent company with regard to the 
subsidiary; and finally, that a right of sell-out is recognized in favor of minority shareholders in those 
subsidiary corporations that are for 90% in the hands of the parent corporation. 
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scope/interests; otherwise, the definition should be uniform.”
27
  
In disdain of its increasing economic importance, also the Italian legislator has always 
avoided giving a legal definition of what a corporate group is, to tell us when one can be 
considered existent, showing itself not very forward-thinking in taking into consideration 
this phenomenon and its implications. The Italian Civil Code of 1942, in fact, ignored it, 
being worried exclusively about the legal regulation of pathological aspects of corporate 
control by single shareholders, which is the aspect that is normally considered the thread 
from which a corporate group comes into being and is an indicator of its existence. The fact 
stems from the purchase of stock of the subsidiary by the holding company. Even in 
subsequent decades, the delicate issues brought forth by the topic of corporate control, 
groups and unitary management were only dealt with occasionally and with specific 
sectorial requests (as in the new “Crisis Code”). Thus, all these legal provisions have 
sparingly — and in certain instances, only at a very embryonic level — dedicated 
themselves to the topic.
28
  
After the reform of company law in 2003, the introduction of Articles 2497 to 
2497-septies of the Civil Code was seen as the general recognition of the corporate group 
phenomenon that has slowly made its way through the Italian legal system, both at the 
levels of court decisions and statutory law (even if only in specific sectors). These statutory 
instruments regulate, even if not organically, the main topics connected to the phenomenon: 
advertising transparency, information commitments, corporate or holding liability, 
protection of minority shareholders and creditors, financing means of a corporation, and 
withdrawal right of an external shareholder. 
From another perspective, we must highlight that in the Italian system we can find 
varying rules in different sources, regarding specific sectors of the group phenomenon, 
without ever offering a unified definition. Now a significant doctrinal effort has been made 
to place order in the fragmented discipline of group organizations, whose rules can be found 
in the Civil Code or specific statutes.
29
 From this, we can see a varied panorama of rules to 
                                                      
27 See Grundmann, fn. 14 at 768. 
28 We must think of Law No. 216/1974 on special administration of large companies going through 
economic crisis (Law No. 95/79; Law No. 270/99); of legal regulation on company group formation (Law No. 
287/93), of banking groups (TUB) and company groups in the area of financial services (TUF) and insurance 
groups (Law No. 174/95; Law No. 175/95; European Law No. 78/1998; Law No. 343/99; Law No. 239/2001); 
and also of legal regulation of consolidated balance sheets (Law No. 127/1991). See Luigi Arturo Bianchi, 
Problemi in materia di disciplina dell’attività di direzione e coordinamento (Problems of the Discipline 
Concerning Direction and Coordination Activities), Rivista delle società (Company Law Review), 320 (2013); 
Nicoletta Michieli, La nuova direzione e coordinamento del gruppo bancario di credito cooperativo alla luce 
della legge n. 49/2016 (The New Direction of Cooperative Credit Banking Group in the Light of law No. 
49/2016), 2 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 453 (2018); Scognamiglio, fn. 1. 
29 Umberto Tombari, Diritto dei gruppi di imprese (Corporate Groups Law), Giuffrè (Milan), (2010); 
Agostino Gambino, Su taluni problemi in tema di gruppi (Some Problems about Corporate Groups), 1 
Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 5 (2012); Fabrizio Guerrera, I regolamenti di 
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which there are different approaches according to the type of corporation considered: 
private limited companies or public companies, which make active use of the stock market, 
or intermediaries, such as banks and financial institutions. The membership to a group 
means the application of a series of norms, stemming from different sources, but all 
characterized by the pursuit of common objectives that together form a “trans-typical” legal 
regulation of groups in the Italian system, with respect to which there is a need to 
harmonize. 
The Italian model, unlike other legislative models, is characterized by a trans-typical 
approach, allowing it to extend privileges provided for in Article 2497 of the Civil Code to 
all companies in a group.
30
  
A condition for applying the discipline contained in the Code to corporate groups is the 
existence of an “activity of direction and coordination,” whose existence is presumed 
(unless proven otherwise) when we can identify one of the conditions of Article 
2497-sexies — that is the conditions for consolidated balance sheets or one of the 
requirements set by Article 2359 of the Civil Code
31
 or Article 2497-septies of the Civil 
Code — that is the presence of a contract or clauses inserted in the bylaws that provide for a 
supremacy of one corporation on the others of the same group. With the recent reform, the 
defining characteristic of the “group” possesses a “unitary direction,” consisting in an 
activity of management of the administrative decisions of the company. Such a 
characteristic is broader than the one of control, which encompasses the power to elect 




From Article 2497-sexies we can deduce that the existence of a power of control can 
                                                                                                                                                    
gruppo (Regulations on Corporate Groups), 9 Le Società (Company Review), 1559 (2014).  
30 Giuseppe Portale, Diritto societario tedesco e diritto societario italiano in dialogo (Dialogue between 
German and Italian Corporate Law), 3 Banca Borsa Titoli di Credito (Bank Review), 597 (2018); Tombari, 
fn. 22 at 108.  
31 As is known, according to Art. 2359 of the Civil Code, we can consider subsidiary corporations as the 
following: a) companies in which another body corporate holds stock thanks to which it holds the majority of 
voting rights in the assembly, taking into consideration also votes in the subsidiary, fiduciary corporations or 
third parties (so-called de jure internal control); b) companies in which another holds stock, thanks to which it 
holds voting rights that are sufficient to exercise a dominating influence, on the body or the assembly, with 
regard to votes in subsidiary, fiduciary corporations or third parties (called de facto internal control); c) 
companies on which another exercises a dominant influence due to particular contractual rights (so-called 
“external or contractual control”). These are contracts (supply of goods; distribution; and franchising — often 
characterized by the presence of exclusive rights agreements) capable of determining the economic subjection 
of one company to another, independently of the purchase of stock. 
32 Paolo Montalenti, Direzione e coordinamento nei gruppi societari: principi e problemi (Direction and 
Coordination in Corporate Groups: Principles and Problems), 1 Rivista delle società (Company Law 
Review), 319 (2007); Paolo Montalenti, Società per azioni, corporate governance e mercati finanziari 
(Public Company, Corporate Governance and Financial Markets), Giuffrè (Milan), at 221 (2011); Bianchi, fn. 
28 at 420. In jurisprudence see the latest Cassazione, Mar. 6, 2018, No. 31997, CED Cassazione 2018. 
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only allow a person to presume a unitary direction; however, such a direction can only be 
proved by the existence of other elements from which an observer can deduce a permanent 
and systematic activity of direction in the administrative decisions of a subsidiary company. 
To sum it up, we must verify whether strategic decisions in key sectors of activities of a 
corporation are in the hands of a holding, with more or less formal methods (e.g. 
deliberations or contracts among the corporations, coordination committees, directional acts 
service orders, instructions, rules of behavior, or even just directive communications 
between bodies of the holding company and the subsidiaries).
33
 
The recent reform of the “Crisis Code” does not offer an ad hoc definition of corporate 
group and historically, economic crises for companies have been governed by statutes 
different from the civil code. In fact, in Article 2, comma 1, h) of the CCII, the corporate 
group is defined as “the set of companies, of body corporates and entities, different from the 
State, which, on the basis of Articles 2497 and 2545-septies of the Civil Code, are placed 
under the direction and coordination of a company, entity or physical person, on the basis of 
a participation bond or a contract; to this effect it is presumed, unless proven otherwise, 
that: 1) the activity of direction and coordination of a company is exercised by a company 
or entity which has to present a consolidated financial statement for all the corporations; 2) 
are under the direction and coordination of a company or entity all those subsidiary 
companies controlled directly or indirectly or placed under joint control, with respect to the 
company or entity which actually exercises activity of direction and coordination.” This 
shows the will of the legislators to employ the notion of corporate group contained in the 
Italian Civil Code (especially in Articles 2497, 2545-septies, and 2359).  
This link between the Crises Code and the traditional structure is evident and not 
exempt from criticism.
34
 For instance, the reference, as it is worded, is confusing. On the 
one hand, it seems to refer only to subsidiary companies, as if the agent exercising the 
control and coordination (a corporation, entity, or physical person) was external to the case; 
an interpretation that is not plausible (and contradicted by the regulation of the procedure, 
in which the holding has a main role) and contrary to the rationale of the norms. However, 
in Article 2, f) of the CCII, which defines “corporate groups of relevant dimensions,” the 
legislators have also mentioned the holding company: “Groups of corporations consisting 
                                                      
33 Cf. Stefania Giovannini, La responsabilità per attività di direzione e coordinamento nei gruppi di 
società (The Responsability for Direction and Coordination in Corporate Groups), Giuffrè (Milan), at 90 
(2007); Andrea Niutta, Sulla presunzione di esercizio dell’attività di direzione e coordinamento di cui agli artt. 
2497 sexies e septies: brevi considerazioni di sistema (Presumption of Exercise of Management and 
Coordination Activities at Art. 2497 sexies and septies, Brief Considerations on the System), 5 Giurisprudenza 
commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 983 (2004). On this point, before the reform, see Rossi, Gruppi e 
governo societario (Corporate Groups and Corporate Governance), in I gruppi di società (Corporate Groups) 
Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi di Venezia (International Convention Venice), Nov. 16–18, 1995, 
Milan, at 20 (1996). 
34 See Scognamiglio, fn. 1. 
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of a holding and subsidiary corporations that must be included in a consolidated financial 
statement, that adhere to the numerical limits of Article 3, Paragraphs 6 and 7, of Directive 
No. 34/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013.” 
On the other hand, although the legislator intends to prevent the government from 
undertaking any activity of direction and coordination — even over companies in which it 
holds shares — by not considering the government a body corporate subject to the direction 
and coordination of a holding company and prohibiting it from undergoing bankruptcy 
procedures, the Code does not make the government’s exclusion clear.  
Although the first jurists to interpret the regulations concluded that the legislator was 
maintaining the same direction of the 2003 reform, the recent reform has initiated some 
progressive shifts forward. First, the CCII is characterized by an inclusive approach, in the 
sense that it clarifies that the subject holding the direction and coordination activity can be 
both a company and an entity, and an individual, while Article 2497 ss. have been 
inapplicable to individuals.
35
 Second, the approach put forward by the CCII seems more 
oriented towards an enhancing of the unity of the corporate group. This is most evident in 
restructuring procedures, aimed at salvaging a company and continuing its activity. In these 
cases, considerations regarding the economic, financial, and organizational connections 
among members of the group are considered prevalent in regard to the net worth of single 
corporations, even if shared foreclosure procedures and precautionary agreements save the 
general principle of autonomy of corporate assets. 
Particularly significant is the approval of the group’s foreclosure agreement (Articles 
284–286 of the CCII) that offers a solution to the divergent interpretations of courts, which 
ended with the negative opinion of the Italian Court of Cassation in 2015. The legislative 
decree that reformed this sector has introduced an important novelty, consisting in the valid 
presentation of one petition by the whole group, requesting admission to the foreclosure 
procedure (by foreclosure we mean an “arrangement with creditors”). 
Article 284, comma 1 of the CCII establishes that “a multitude of corporations in 
economic crisis or insolvency, belonging to the same group and all having their main centre 
of business in Italy, may propose a plea to access a precautionary foreclosure agreement on 
                                                      
35 In jurisprudence, see Cassazione, Mar. 6, 2017, No. 5520; Trib. Milano, Feb. 4, 2016, 3 Fallimento 
(Insolvency Review), 745 (2016); Cassazione, Nov. 18, 2010, No. 23344, CED Cassazione, (2010); 
Cassazione, Mar. 13, 2003, No. 3724, 3 Giurisprudenza Italiana (Italian Jurisprudence Review), 562 (2004). 
In doctrine, see Roberto Weigmann, Nota sulla configurabilità di una holding di tipo personale (Note on the 
Configurability of a Personal Holding Company), 1 Giurisprudenza Italiana (Italian Jurisprudence Review), 3 
(2004); Marina Spiotta, Concessione abusiva di credito. Fidarsi è bene, ma non fidarsi è meglio: osservazioni 
sulla concessione abusiva di credito (Abusive Credit Granting. Trust Is Good, But Not Trusting Is Better: 
Considerations of the Abusive Granting Credit), 2 Giurisprudenza Italiana (Italian Jurisprudence Review), 
480 (2018); Edoardo Morino, La responsabilità della holding persona fisica: fisiologia o patologia? (Holding 
Individuals Liability: Physiology or Pathology?), 2 Giurisprudenza Italiana (Italian Jurisprudence Review), 
403 (2015). 
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the basis of Article 40, with a joint plan or a series of connected and interfering plans.” 
However, the possibility of using only one foreclosure procedure for the whole group is 
dependent on the proof of the existence of “reasons of convenience, for a better satisfaction 
of the creditors and single corporations, in the choice to present a single foreclosure plan or 
a plurality of plans that are connected and interfering, instead of individual foreclosure 
procedures, one for each corporation.”
36
  
Group unity considerations are instead of less importance in the case of court 
liquidation (which will substitute the current foreclosure procedure of bankruptcy) in which 
the profile of “group unity” resides solely in the “means of coordinating active assets.”
37
 
According to Article 287 of the CCII, more than one companies in a state of insolvency, 
part of the same group and all having their main center of business in the Italian State, can 
request that they follow the same court procedure and are heard by the same judge. This can 
happen, however, only “when a coordination between severance plans is opportune, with 
the aim of better satisfying customers of the corporations within the group,” without 
bringing into question the independence of active and passive assets. 
From this point of view, the court must take into consideration economic and productive 
ties between companies, the consistence of the capital of the different companies, and the 
presence of the same executive officers. Another aspect must be noted, from which the 
unitary character of the procedure emerges: the liquidation procedure. Article 292 of the 
CCII introduces a partial modification of the order of payments by the insolvency 
administrator: credits stemming from “downstream” and “upstream” financing of 
companies within the group
38
 and stipulated at a later date (or during the year before) than 
the presentation of the plea for judicial liquidation, are deferred with respect to the 
distribution of current assets.
39
 
Finally, it is worth highlighting the flexible nature of the new legal regulation as it does 
not contemplate the filing of a unique plea for all the corporations within the group as the 
                                                      
36 This procedure is regulated by Art. 286 of the CCII, which states that if “the different companies 
belonging to the group have their main centre of interest in different jurisdictions, the court competent for the 
hearing is the one identified by Art. 27, with regards to the centre of interests of the company, entity or 
physical person that exercises direction and control (on the basis of the information published according to 
Art. 2497-bis of the Civil Code) or, in the absence of this, of the company with the largest outstanding debt on 
the basis of the last financial report approved.” In case of acceptance, the procedure is the same for all the 
companies, with one judge and one judicial commissioner for all companies of the group, only one fund and 
division of costs proportional of active assets of each corporation. 
37 See Scognamiglio, fn. 1 at 423. 
38 The legal rule has an area of application that is wider than that of Art. 2497-quinquies of the Civil 
Code, which only talks about credits stemming from loans descending from the holding corporation to other 
companies of the group. 
39  The legal rule raises delicate problems of coordination with the legal rule contained in Art. 
2497-quinquies of the Civil Code, which is centered on the analysis of whether the loan made was reasonable 
and makes no reference to Art. 292 or to Art. 221 of the CCII. 
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sole remedy but allows the filing of independent pleas by the holding company and one or 
more of the subsidiaries. In the latter case, the procedure will follow its ordinary course; 
however, the existence of group connections with other enterprises will determine the 
application of information duties on the basis of Article 289 of the CCII
40
 as well as duties 
to cooperate as set forth in Article 288 of the CCII
41
 when a plea is filed by one corporation 
and another plea by other members of the group is simultaneously accepted (thus creating a 
multitude of procedures). 
 
B. Transparency and Disclosure Obligations within Corporate Groups 
Among the most important innovations introduced by the recent CCII regarding 
corporate groups (connected to the general principles of Article 2497 of the Civil Code) are 
the information duties imposed on a corporation that is a part of a group. The fulfillment of 
these information duties is a prerequisite for entering a crisis or insolvency procedure. 
Non-compliance with these duties makes the plea filed before a court inadmissible. 
Specifically, Article 289 of the CCII establishes that “the plea filed in order to access a 
procedure to regulate a crisis or a situation of insolvency, presented by a corporation 
belonging to a group, must contain analytical information on the group’s structure and the 
participation or contractual restrictions existing among the companies and specify the 
company registration list or lists in which information duties have been carried out under 
Article 2497-bis of the Civil Code. The corporation must also deposit the group financial 
statement, where it has been compiled.” 
The statutory provision is strictly connected to the power, given to the directive body of 
the procedure (both in the foreclosure agreement and in the judicial liquidation procedure), 
to obtain information from offices of distinct and parallel foreclosure procedures pertaining 
to corporations of the same group (Article 288 of the CCII), in a spirit of cooperation to 
handle the crisis efficiently. It must be noted that similar forms of cooperation already exist 
                                                      
40 Art. 284 CCII prescribes that: 1) the plea must contain detailed information on group structure and on 
participation or contract restrictions existing between companies and also the company registration list or lists 
in which the appropriate legal information can be found (in compliance with Art. 2497-bis of the Civil Code); 
2) The consolidated financial report of the group, if written, must be attached to the plea along with 
appropriate documentation, with regard to the agreement of composition with creditors or restructuring 
agreements; 3) the unique plan or connected plans, addressed to creditors (ex Art. 56, co. 2), must be capable 
of fixing the outstanding debt of each corporation and allow the composure of the financial situation of each 
one. An independent professional figure will attest the veracity of company data and the feasibility of the plan 
or plans. On request of the debtor companies, such plans will be published in the registration lists indicated in 
Art. 2497-bis of the Civil Code. 
41 If companies in the group have their center of business in different jurisdictions, the competent court is 
the one in which the first plea was deposited. If the pleas for liquidation procedure were all present at the 
same time, the court that is competent for the hearing is the one identified on the basis of Art. 27, in regard to 
main business center of the corporation that exercises direction and coordination, or in the absence of such an 
entity, of the corporation with the highest outstanding debt on the basis of the last financial report. 
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in the area of insolvency management in cross-border situations via the stipulation of 
protocols between insolvency procedures (EU Regulation No. 848/2015). 
Such a need to ensure a flow of information that is useful to reconstructing connections 
within a group helps explains why Article 289 of the CCII provides that “the court or the 
insolvency administrator or the judicial commissioner may, in order to ascertain the 
existence of group connections, request [from] the Italian Commission for Companies and 
the Stock Exchange [i.e. the Italian equivalent to the American SEC] or any other Public 
Authority and trust companies, information on shareholders and stock assigned to them[.]” 
Replies to such requests must be received within 15 days of the request. Finally, more 
transparency on the structure and the organization of the corporate group is indispensable to 
the ability of the insolvency administrator to exercise the powers invested in him/her by 
Articles 290 and 291 of the CCII.  
The ample space dedicated in the new regulations to information duties is the latest 
testimony of the central position of transparency in corporate matters, both at European and 
national level.
42
 At the national level exists the Action Plan 2012, which has among its 
main objectives “the improvement of available information on corporate groups” and at the 
European level exists the EU Directive on the Rights of Shareholders,
43
 which emerges 
strongly in Article 2497-bis of the Civil Code, both in the pursuit of transparency of group 
structures and the disclosure of the main acts and facts regarding it. These efforts allow the 
public to know and evaluate the level of risk in an investment or commitment, and are 
important both from an internal and an external point of view.
44
 
The first pursuit of transparency of group structure consists of the strengthening of the 
position of the subsidiary company, the minority shareholders, and the creditors, all of 
whom come into contact with the corporation and must be placed in the condition to make 
an informed decision about entering or remaining in the group, or whether or not to initiate 
dealings with corporations belonging to it.
45
 The second effort of disclosure of the main 
                                                      
42  Cf. Grundmann, fn. 14 at 778; Marco Maugeri, Gruppi di società e informazioni privilegiate 
(Corporate Groups and Inside Informations), 4 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 
907 (2017).  
43 Paolo Montalenti, L’informazione e il diritto commerciale: principi e problemi (Information and 
Commercial Law: Principles and Problems), 4 Rivista di diritto civile (Civil Law Review), 780 (2015); 
Marchetti, fn. 20. 
44 Cf. Tombari, fn. 29; Paolo Montalenti, Società per azioni, corporate governance e mercati finanziari 
(Public Company, Corporate Governance and Financial Markets), Giuffrè (Milan), at 255 (2011). 
45 Paolo Montalenti, Gruppi e conflitto di interessi nella riforma del diritto societario (Corporate Groups 
and Conflict of Interests in the Corporate Law Reform), 3 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial 
Jurisprudence), 628 (2002). In the same direction, see Umberto Tombari, I gruppi di società, in Oreste 
Cagnasso & Luciano Panzani, Le nuove s.p.a. (Corporate Groups, New Public Companies), Zanichelli 
(Bologna), at 1743 (2010); Alberto Jorio, I gruppi (Corporate Groups), in Stefano Ambrosini, La riforma 
delle società. Profili della nuova disciplina (The Company Reform. Aspects of New Discipline), Giappichelli 
(Turin), at 198 (2003); Francesco Galgano, Il nuovo diritto societario (New Corporate Law), in Francesco 
Galgano, Trattato di diritto commerciale e di diritto pubblico dell’economia (Commercial law and public 
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acts and facts is expressed by Article 2497-bis of the Civil Code, which contemplates some 
very articulated formalities that range from publicity duties in specific sections of the 
company register on the belonging to a group, in corporate acts, and correspondence 
(according to Article 2199 of the Civil Code), to transparency in the note to the financial 
statement and the report on the statement itself. This information concerns the relationship 
between subsidiaries and holding corporations. 
Publicity in the company register, if nothing is specified otherwise, serves merely to 
certify the company’s existence to third parties, allowing the latter to understand the fact 
that a company is under the direction of another, where such influence has a significant 
effect on the policies and outlooks of a company, without being opposable to them until it is 
proved that they effectively were aware of this fact. Not by chance, the start and the end of 
the activity of direction and coordination constitute one of the three hypotheses in which a 
shareholder may withdraw, according to Article 2497-quarter of the Civil Code, as they 
concern an alteration of the level of risk of their investment and allow a certain flexibility in 
the management, without permitting any marauding techniques.  
The importance of information duties emerges even more evidently during the 
implementation of the group activity, embracing all its life and action, and acquiring a 
particular importance in the evaluation of the executive officers and their hypothetical 
liability.
46
 The central role of transparency and the enhancement of information in group 
contexts emerge from numerous indications of the Italian Stock Market Autoregulation 
Code in its most recent version from July 2018.
47
 The Code is in line with EU 
Recommendation No. 208/2016 and Regulation No. 22/2016
48
 enacted by the Italian 
                                                                                                                                                    
economic law), XXIX, Cedam (Padua), at 191 (2003).  
46 We can refer to the obligation to state in a specific voice of the report a summary of the main 
specification of the parent company and its last financial report ex Art. 2497-bis, co. 4, or the obligation under 
Art. 2497-bis, co. 5, to draft a report on the interactions with the person/company exercising direction and 
coordination and other companies that are in a similar situation, as well as the effects of such power on the 
administering and performance of the company. Another obligation is present in Art. 2497-ter of the Civil 
Code, which establishes that the decisions that the subsidiary companies make must be well justified, 
indicating the reasons and interest that led to the adoption of the decision. Also, the executives of the 
corporation must indicate sufficiently these points in their final report to make the evaluation of group 
policies and coordination activity easier. 
47 The Code was approved by the Committee for corporate governance in March 2006 and was last 
modified in March 2010. The latest version of July 2018. See Simone Alvaro, Paolo Ciccaglioni, e Giovanni 
Siciliano, L’autodisciplina in materia di corporate governance. Un’analisi dell’esperienza italiana (The 
Self-Discipline in Corporate Governance. An Analysis of the Italian Experience), Consob Edition, Mondadori 
(Rome), (2013). 
48 For a general overview see Giovanni Strampelli, L’informazione societaria a quindici anni dal TUF: 
profili evolutivi e problemi (Corporate Information of Fifteen Years from TUF: Aspects of Evolution and 
Problems), 7 Rivista delle Società (Company Law Review), 991 (2014); Paolo Montalenti, L’informazione 
nei gruppi societari, Le società per azioni oggi. Tradizione, attualità e prospettive (Corporate Information, 
Italian Public Company, Tradition, Today and Prospectives), 2 Rivista delle società (Company Law Review), 
312 (2007); Paolo Montalenti, Corporate governance, sistema dei controlli interni e ruolo della Consob: da 
garante della trasparenza a presidio della correttezza della gestione (Corporate Governance, Internal 
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Authority for Vigilance of Insurance companies (i.e. Institute for Insurance Supervision). 
These favor the iteration of control mechanisms on different corporations via informative 
and consulting procedures. Despite this, the organizational structure of checks falls within 
the right of self-organization of the company based on the type of the activity and the 
dimension and structure of the group (also taking into account the legal context in which it 
operates).
49  
C. Group Interest and “Compensational Advantage Theory” 
In addition to being very complex and articulated, the debate on group interest is a 
source of delays in the evolution of the proposed directive for the harmonization of 
legislation in this sector. At the EU level, two different models have clashed: the German 
model and the French model, the latter closer to Italian legislation, which is, in its own, an 
interesting evolution. 
In the German model, the possible disadvantages suffered by a subsidiary are 
legitimized only if the losses are compensated at the end of the financial year in which a 
specific operation was conducted. Otherwise such a management decision is invalid and 
triggers the duty to pay damages. The German model was adopted in the 1984 Proposal of 
European Legislation and translates into a very rigid “case by case” approach, which aims 
to prevent any harm to subsidiary corporations that cannot be met by some forms of 
compensation. 
The codification of the “business judgment rule” is centered on the company’s interest. 
This depletes the group’s interest and, therefore, the executive officers of the subsidiary 
corporation cannot rely on this rule to mitigate their liability.
50
 In contrast, the French 
courts proposed a solution in the 1980s that was inspired by the “Rozenblum Doctrine,”
51
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Control System and the Role of Consob: As Guarantor of Transparency to Safeguard the Correctness of 
Management), 1 Rivista delle società (Company Law Review), 120 (2015); Giuliana Scognamiglio, Recenti 
tendenze in tema di assetti organizzativi degli intermediari finanziari (e non solo) (Recent Trends in the 
Organization of Financial Intermediaries (and Others)), 1 Banca borsa e titoli di credito (Bank Law Review), 
137 (2010).   
49 See Montalenti, fn. 48.  
50 Christoph Teichmann, Europäisches Konzernrecht: Vom Schutzrecht zum Enabling Law (European 
Group Law: From Intellectual Property to Enabling Law), 58 Die Aktiengesellschaft (Stock Corporation Act), 
191 (2013); Tombari, fn. 22 at 107; Francesco Chiappetta & Umberto Tombari, Perspectives on Group 
Corporate Governance and European Company Law, 1 European Compenu and Financial Law Review, 261 
(2012); Hopt, fn. 14 at 15.  
51 So called because of the decision by the penal chamber of the French Court of Cassation that first 
enunciated the principle. The framework linked to the principle of compensational advantages expressed by 
the “Rozenblum Doctrine” was considered adequate also by the Forum Europaeum, which drafted a 
recommendation that EU bodies should send to member States, based on the following principles: a) the 
group must be structured in a balanced and stable way, b) the company is placed inside a coherent and stable 
group policy, c) the executive officers can reasonably believe that any prejudice will be compensated within 
an appropriate time period (for further information see Vv. AA., Corporate Group Law For Europe: Forum 
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which aims to expand the admissibility of group strategy even at a detriment to the 
subsidiary, attributing relevance to the following four elements that are deemed conditions 
of admissibility of directional acts of a group: a solid group structure; a coherent group 
strategy in which every single management act is rooted; the fact that a subsidiary company 
that is damaged does not systematically incur disadvantages from group strategy; and, 
finally, a company not in decline.
52
 It must also be said, however, that the enthusiasm that 
surfaced during the drafting sessions for this second approach has received severe criticism 
because of the belief that such an option would have opened the door “for unforeseeable 
inroads into the means of subsidiaries.”
53
 
Even when compared to the two approaches, which continue to find scholarly support, 
the solution adopted in the Italian system is extremely competitive, connecting itself to the 
Rozenblum Doctrine and focusing on the balancing of group interest and subsidiary 
interest. The Italian legal system has developed the theory of “compensational 
advantages”
54
 in relation to what can be reconstructed as group interest. This is 
fundamental in the application of rules governing liability for unitary management, the 
evaluation of the legitimacy of group operations and, in case of insolvency 
procedures/liquidation, the repeal or ineffectiveness of such operations. 
As stated in Article 290 of the CCII, the insolvency administrator may initiate, against 
the corporations that are a part of the same group, the following actions: a) actions intended 
to obtain a declaration of ineffectiveness of acts and contracts concluded in the five years 
before the filing of a plea for judicial liquidation, which have moved resources for the 
benefit of a specific company of the group, damaging the creditors of another except for 
cases established in Article 2497, comma 1 of the Civil Code (the beneficiary corporation 
can prove it was unaware of the prejudicial nature of the act or contract); b) filing of a 
                                                                                                                                                    
Europaeum Corporate Group Law, 1 European Business Organization Law Review, 165 (2000). 
52 On French trend see William Parienté, The Effects of the Concept of Corporate Group in France, 2 
ECFR, 317 (2007); Yves Guyon, The Law of Groups of Companies in France, in Eddy Wymeersch ed. 
Groups of Companies in the EEC — A Survey Report, De Gruyter (Berlin), at 141 (1993).  
53 See Grundmann, fn. 14 at 772, No. 59. 
54 The majority of legal scholars, while considering that group interest may not be pursued to the 
detriment of subsidiaries, has come to recognize that the disadvantage to the subsidiary can be compensated 
by an advantage to all the group (Franco Bonelli, Conflitto di interesse nei gruppi di società (Conflict of 
Interest in Corporate Groups), 1 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 219 (1992); 
Paolo Montalenti, Conflitto di interessi nei gruppi di società e teoria dei vantaggi compensative (Conflict of 
Interests in Corporate Groups and the Theory of Compensatory Benefits), 5 Giurisprudenza commerciale 
(Commercial Jurisprudence), 710 (1995); Gastone Cottino, Dal vecchio al nuovo diritto azionario: con 
qualche avviso ai naviganti (From the Old to the New Corporate Law: With Some Warning to Interested 
Parties), 1 Giurisprudenza Italiana (Italian Jurisprudence Review), 5 (2013). For the latest court decisions, 
see Cassazione, Jan. 30, 2019, No. 10633; Cassazione, Sep. 14, 2017, No. 50080 (on the relevance of 
compensatory benefits for criminal purposes); Cassazione, Nov. 10, 2016, No. 22215; Cassazione, Mar. 17, 
2015, No. 23997, Diritto e giustizia (Law and Justice), (2015); Cassazione, Mar. 12, 2015, No. 17355; 
Cassazione, Apr. 24, 2013, No. 28520; Cassazione, Feb. 21, 2013, No. 20039. 
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motion for revocation of acts put into being after the insolvency plea was filed, based on 
Article 166, comma 1, letters a), b) and two years before the filing of the plea or the year 
just before, hypotheses established by Article 166, comma 1, letters c) and d).
55
 From these 
statutory provisions we can infer a connection and other points to think about when 
contemplating the notion of “group interest” connected to the area of corporate liability. 
D. Abuse of Unified Management 
Starting from the legal defense of group interest, the legal rules laid down by the Code 
on the abuse of a directional position, filtered through the lens of compensational 
advantages when examining the special powers invested in the insolvency administrator, 
assume a new meaning within insolvency procedures. In fact, according to Article 291 of 
the CCII, this administrator — both in case of an insolvency as a single procedure for the 
entire group, or in the case of a multitude of single insolvency procedures — may legally 
initiate lawsuits against the executive officers, based on Article 2497 of the Civil Code. 
Moreover, he/she may also file the special complaint (Article 2409 of the Civil Code) 
against executives and auditors of corporations belonging to the group that are not a part of 
any insolvency procedure. Considering also that the CCII contemplates a physical person as 
the holding entity, we can assume that the filing of a lawsuit for special liability (Article 
2497 of the Civil Code) is also possible.
 
 
As known, Article 2497, comma 1 of the Italian Civil Code states that corporations or 
entities that are engaged in activities of direction and coordination of other companies, if 
acting in their own business interest or in others’ in violation of the principles of correct 
company and business management of the subsidiaries, are directly responsible to the 
shareholders of the subsidiaries in case of damages to the profitability and economic value 
of their shares.
56
 They are also responsible to company creditors for damages to the net 
worth of the company and their expectation of payment.
57
 
                                                      
55 The reference is to the legal discipline contained in the CCII, in which a part of Art. 67 of the old 
Bankruptcy Law was inserted, doubling, however, the time period for a court appeal with reference to certain 
categories of acts. It is thought that discrepancies may well be amended thanks to enabling act No. 20/2019.   
56 Vincenzo Cariello, Direzione e coordinamento di società e responsabilità: spunti interpretativi iniziali 
per una riflessione generale (Direction and Coordination of Companies and Liability: Some Interpretative 
Keys for a General Reflection), 10 Rivista delle società (Company Law Review), 1241 (2003); Giovannini, fn. 
33; Marco Maugeri, Interesse sociale, interesse dei soci e interesse del gruppo (Company Interest, Interests of 
Shareholders and Group Interest), 1 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 66 (2012).  
57 Incidentally, we wish to indicate also that British legal experience knows an embryonic discipline of 
parent company liability with respect to creditors of a subsidiary corporations. We refer to the liability for 
wrongful trading established by Section 214 of the 1986 Insolvency Act. The latter establishes a liability on 
the managers in case of continuing activities knowing that the company could not have avoided an insolvency 
procedure. This kind of liability is extended to the so-called “shadow director,” and via him to the parent 
company if the latter acted as such with regard to the subsidiary. Taking from the British model, a liability for 
wrongful trading which the parent company can incur has been recommended by the “Forum Europaeum” on 
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It is evident that executives are liable when they have the sole and unique direction of a 
group only when the holding corporation acts “in its own interest or in another’s interest in 
violation of principles of correct company and business management of subsidiary 
companies.” This means that the source of liability is not the unilateral direction but only an 
“abuse” of it. This elucidation is particularly evident in the final part of Paragraph 1 of 
Article 2497, in which we find a limit to this liability. The rule states that “there is no 
liability when the damage is missing in the light of the total result of the activity of direction 
and coordination” (so-called “liability for missing compensation”); or “(when the damage) 
results completely eliminated, even subsequently to operation which are designed to obtain 
such a result” (so-called “liability for omission of compensative operations”).  
From here, we can infer the clear intent of Article 2497 to privilege the executive 
officers, as it allows the board of administration of the holding not just to impart orders to 
subsidiary corporations
58
 but also to impart orders that are prima facie detrimental, with a 
greater range of the one characterizing the German law on stocks. The latter is limited to 
public limited companies and requires an accountancy form of compensation for damages.
59
 
Within the context of the group, at the heart of the system of liability there is an entity 
that exercises an activity of direction and control and not the single executive officers.
 60
 
According to the majority opinion, from the existence of an activity of direction and 
management stems a real “obligation with external effects” — operative also in regard to 
external shareholders, or a corporation in which stock is held, and its creditors — to the 
correct company and business management, with the aim of protecting minority 
shareholders and creditors of the subsidiary corporations.
61
  
Doctrinal studies and jurisprudence are divided on the content and the exact extent of 
this general provision, which has been criticized for its vagueness.
62
 Some have considered 
it a genuine duty to act respecting the principles of correct company management and so it 
consists of the duty to draft adequate plans and strategies; others, instead, consider it a 
criterion for the exercise of an economic activity, and, as such, discretionary. 
The criterion would, thus, assume a double function: evaluative (i.e. an inspection of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
the law of corporate groups, see Tombari, fn. 29 at 55; Paul Davies, Introduction to Company Law, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford), at 95 (2002). 
58 Danilo Galletti, Analitica della responsabilità patrimoniale e principio di proporzionalità (Analytics of 
Asset Liability and the Principle of Proportionality), 1 Giustizia civile (Civil Justice Review), 161 (2019).  
59 Volker Hemmerich & Mathias Habersack, Akzien – und GmbH-Konzernrecht. Kommentar (Stock 
corporation and Gmbh Act. Kommentar), Beck (Munich), at 678 (2013); Uwe Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (Stock 
Corporation Act), Beck (Munich), at 1705 (2012). 
60 This framework is like the EMCA model. 
61 The prospective in this case is diametrically opposite to the EMCA model. 
62 Roberto Sacchi, Sulla responsabilità da direzione e coordinamento nella riforma delle società di 
capitali (On the Direction Liability in the Reform of Corporate Law), 2 Giurisprudenza commerciale 
(Commercial Jurisprudence), 274 (2003).  
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content of a specific operation) and supplementary (i.e. a duty of conduct or to act on the 
dominant corporation).
63
 According to the theory adopted, we can ascribe omissions as 
well to the holding company, in order to sanction (as legal scholars proposed before the 
latest reform
64
) not just abuses but also a failure to exercise uniform direction and control of 




With regard to an abuse of unitary direction of the group, single shareholders of a 
subsidiary may have standing for detriments to the turn over and the market value of their 
stock
66
; creditors may also have the same standing (or in case of bankruptcy, the insolvency 
administrator of the corporation) for the “damage” to the corporation’s net worth, as well as 
to the subsidiary itself.
67
 The liability of the parent company towards an external 
shareholder and a creditor is subsidiary in nature: basically, the company exercising control 
has a sort of “benefit” residing in the fact that a person must first file a plea against the 
subsidiary. This mechanism for the protection of an external shareholder and creditor of the 
subsidiary (overlooked at the EU level
68
) is further evidence of the importance of the 
“group” because the liability of the subsidiary company is automatic and not connected to 
any evaluation concerning its abetting and/or intention in the commission of the damaging 
                                                      
63 Fabrizio Guerrera, «Compiti» e responsabilità del socio di controllo (“Tasks” and Liability of the 
Controlling Shareholder), 1 Rivista di Diritto Societario (Corporate Law Review), at 20 (2009); see also, with 
a different interpretation, Umberto Tombari, Poteri e doveri dell’organo amministrativo di una s.p.a. «di 
gruppo» (Rights and Duties of Directors in a Company “Belonging to a Group”), 1 Rivista di Diritto 
Societario (Corporate Law Review), at 131 (2009); Maura Garcea, I gruppi di società di persone (Partnership 
Groups), Jovene (Naples), at 146 (2008). 
64 Piergaetano Marchetti, Sul controllo e poteri della controllante (On Control and Rights of the Parent 
Company), in Balzarini, Carcano, e Mucciarelli, fn. 10 at 1558. 
65 See Pierpaolo M. Sanfilippo, Il controllo di meritevolezza sugli statuti di società (The Merit Control on 
the Statutes of Companies), 1 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 159 (2015). 
66 Antonio Rossi, Il ruolo della controllata e la tutela del socio esterno nella nuova disciplina dei gruppi 
(The Role of the Subsidiary and the Protection of the External Partner in the New Group Regulation), 7 
Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 979 (2014). 
67 Oreste Cagnasso, La qualificazione della responsabilità per la violazione dei principi di corretta 
gestione nei confronti dei creditori della società eterodiretta (The Qualification of the Liability for the 
Violation of the Principles of Correct Management towards the Creditors of the Heterodirect Company), 11 Il 
Fallimento (Insolvency Review), 1438 (2008); Galgano, fn. 45 at 981;  Giuliana Scognamiglio, Danno 
sociale e azione individuale nella disciplina della responsabilità da direzione e coordinamento (Company 
Damage and Individual Action in the Discipline of Management Liability and Coordination), in Pietro 
Abbadessa & Giuseppe Portale, Il nuovo diritto delle società. Liber amicorum Gian Franco Campobasso 
(The New Corporate Law), Utet (Turin), at 947 (2007); A. Pinto, La responsabilità degli amministratori per 
«danno diretto» agli azionisti (The Administrator Liability for “Direct Damage” to Shareholders), Id. at 938; 
Sacchi, fn. 62 at 668; Antonio Pavone La Rosa, Nuovi profili della disciplina dei gruppi societari (New 
Aspects of Corporate Groups Law), 3 Rivista delle società (Company Law Review), 765 (2003); Roberto 
Weigmann, I gruppi di società (Corporate Groups), in VV. AA., La riforma del diritto societario (The 
Corporate Law Reform), Giuffrè (Milan), at 210 (2003). 
68 See Grundmann, fn. 14 at 780. 
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Along with the liability of the person exercising activities of control and direction there 
is that of the person who “in any way took part in the damaging act and, within the limits of 
the advantages received, whomever benefitted from it” (Article 2497, comma 2 of the Civil 
Code). This statutory disposition seems to include a multitude of people, including 
executives and directors of the parent corporation; auditors not exercising their power set 
forth in Article 2409, Section 1 and last, of the Italian Civil Code; executives of the 
subsidiary that put directive orders into effect, even if these were not prejudicial; 
shareholders of the holding that voluntarily and knowingly benefitted from the abuse 




Combining the principles of liability with the theory of compensational advantages, the 
honesty of the conduct of the parent company executives will consist not only in the 
correctness of the instructions on management of the corporation but also with respect to 
the balance between the interests of the holder and those of the subsidiaries.
71
 In 
jurisprudence, after a decade of the application of Article 2497 and the aforementioned 
criteria, a difficult problem has emerged on the possibility to define compensational 
advantages, which may be thought of from a purely quantitative and proportional point of 
view, with the aim of obtaining an equivalent compensation that is certain and determined 
in amount. The alternative is a more elastic definition of such advantages, taking also into 
consideration the possible (and future) positive effects that may stem from such operations. 
The evaluation may arrive at results that are the complete opposite if we adhere to the 
theory that an advantage may rise from an overall evaluation of the corporate group’s 
performance or the theory for which a rigorous comparison between positive and negative 
effects of the subsidiary’s operation must be done. This means that possible benefits 
obtained or obtainable by a subsidiary from other means cannot be taken into consideration. 
The theory that reconstructs the advantage via a procedure that takes into consideration 
                                                      
69 Oreste Cagnasso, Le azioni di responsabilità sociale nei confronti degli amministratori e i tempi e i 
contenuti della deliberazione dell’ente socio (The Actions of Liability towards the Directors and Timing and 
Contents of the Resolution of the Shareholders), 1 Il Nuovo diritto societario (The New Company Law), 7 
(2015).  
70 Giuseppe Guizzi, Partecipazioni qualificate e gruppi di società (Qualified Holdings and Corporate 
Groups), in Niccolò Abriani, Diritto delle società. Manuale breve (Corporate Law), Giuffrè (Milan), at 325 
(2012); Weigmann, fn. 67 at 208; Sacchi, fn. 62 at 661; Cariello, fn. 56 at 1249. 
71 For the criminal consequences of such conduct see Ignazio Zingales, La Cassazione sul Crac Cirio: 
ancora cautela nell’interpretazione della clausola sui vantaggi compensativi applicata ai reati fallimentari 
che coinvolgono gruppi di società (The Court of Cassation on Bankruptcy: Still Caution to the Interpretation 
of the Theory on Compensatory Advantages Applied to Bankruptcy Crimes Involving Groups), 12 Cassazione 
Penale (Criminal Court Review), 2427 (2018). In jurisprudence, see Cassazione, Oct. 6. 2017, No. 4400; 
Cassazione, Sep. 27, 2016, No. 52316, 12 Cassazione penale (Criminal Court Review), 3352 (2017), 
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both the possible future consequences and possible benefits that do not stem directly from 
the operation considered seems preferable
72
 and is susceptible to being applied to moments 
of economic crisis of the group as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The novelties introduced by the CCII are important additions to the newly emergent 
“trans-typical” nature of corporate groups whose legal evolution has been described. These 
additions have solidified the CCII’s importance in the influential sector of insolvency. 
In the present work, we have tried to briefly examine the main characteristics in relation 
to the overall legal regulation of corporate groups; so, in conclusion, it is appropriate to 
highlight the following aspects. First, the legal innovation is a demonstration of the 
importance of company structure within groups. Whatever the structure may be, the 
subjugation to another company’s directional power entails the relocation of decisional 
power outside of the subsidiary’s structure, with a substantial redefinition of the 
organizational shape of the subsidiaries (with identification of formalities and functions of 
company bodies as a whole) and their interior decisional processes, and is susceptible to 




From the point of view of organizational layouts, the power of direction and 
coordination has, as a consequence, a more or less severe restriction of managing autonomy 
of the subsidiary company, resulting in a remodeling of the company’s interest that is 
specifically pursued by the latter, also in view of applying Article 2391 of the Italian Civil 
Code and the possible alteration of tasks (and liability) of the inner bodies.
74
 This is 
particularly evident in situations of insolvency and the legislator is aware of this fact both in 
                                                      
72 Cf. Cassazione Dec. 5, 2017, No. 29139, available at il societario.it, (2018) (last visited Sep. 15, 2019), 
commented by Marzo (La posizione della società eterodiretta nel regime di responsabilità per i danni (The 
Role of the Heterodirect Company and Its Liability).  
73 Paolo Montalenti, Il sistema dei controlli societari: un quadro d’insieme (The System of Company 
Control: An Overview), Giurisprudenza Italiana (Italian Jurisprudence Law), 1175 (2013); Riccardo Perotta & 
Luca Bertoli, Assetti organizzativi, piani strategici, sistema di controllo interno e gestione dei rischi. La 
corporate governance a dieci anni dalla riforma del diritto societario (Organizational Assets, Policy Plans, 
Internal Control System and Risk Management. The Corporate Governance of Ten Years from the Corporate 
Law Reform), Rivista dei dottori commercialisti (Chartered Accountants Review), 863 (2013).  
74 Fabrizio Guerrera, La responsabilità “deliberativa” nelle società di capitali (The “Deliberative” 
Liability in Companies), Giappichelli (Turin), at 153 (2004); Giuseppe Di Sabato, Il principio di correttezza 
nei rapporti societari (The Priciple of Correctness in Company Relations), in Abbadessa & Portale, fn. 67 at 
131 (2006); Giuseppe Portale, Rapporti fra assemblea e organo gestorio nei sistemi di amministrazione (The 
Relation between Shareholders and Management in Corporate Governance), in Abbadessa & Portale, fn. 67 
at 31; Giuseppe Portale & Alessandra Daccò, Accentramento di funzioni e di servizi nel gruppo e nel ruolo 
dell’assemblea della società controllata (The Centralization of Functions and Services in the Corporate 
Group and in the Role of the Subsidiary Company’s Shareholders), 2 Rivista di diritto privato (Private Law 
Review), 463 (2006). 
Commento [H32]: Please provide 
volume/issue number of the journals. 
558 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA  [Vol. 14: 533 
the moment when it explicitly gives value to synergies within the group in the construction 
of plans to solve an economic crisis, and also when the legislator indicates that group logic 
and interest are an element for evaluating the legitimacy of corporate acts that are 
potentially damaging to creditors and corporations belonging to the group.   
From another point of view, this is a confirmation of the relevance that activities of 
direction and coordination have assumed (also when the holding corporation is actually a 
physical person) as a linchpin for the application of the statutory legislation regarding 
corporate groups, along with the recognition of the role assumed by private legal autonomy, 
which is given ample space in the new legal discipline. In this sense, it connects itself to the 
importance of group regulation or the routine approach, which is now widespread to 
discipline relations between group entities through a specific contractual regulation. As 
known, in the Italian legal system, there is no specific statutory discipline or definition of 
what group regulation should be, much less of what a “directional contract” is (a legal 
institute that exists in the German system). The rule set forth in Article 2497-septies is 
significant because it gives importance to “activity of direction and coordination of 
companies based on a contract…or company statute terms.” At an EU level, the proposed 
directive, the 2000 European Forum, and the Action Plan of 2003 have already adopted the 
practice and correctly underlined the usefulness of this instrument to regulate the emanation 
of directives, create a unified decision center and legitimize possible compensational 
mechanisms. 
Even in the regulation of group insolvency, attention to the importance of contracts is 
emerging. Contracts are used as an instrument not just to regulate relationships between 
corporations that are part of the group but also to solve situations of insolvency. In the 
CCII, private autonomy assumes great importance both when it concerns the severance plan 
with creditors of the group and in relation to agreements on information flows between 
insolvency procedures, inspired by the EU (see the regulation of transparency in 
cross-border operations). For example, in case of one severance agreement for an entire 
group, it is possible to imagine the liquidation of only certain corporations, with others 
continuing their activities based on a prognosis of the utility for creditors of all the 
companies within the group. 
Could we not consider this fact a promotion of private autonomy, in the context of 
economic activities exercised as a group instead of individually, taking into consideration 
group structure and economic flows with this entity? The space assigned to private 
autonomy is truly wide, if we think that the legislator is contemplating the introduction 
within the plan of contractual and reorganizational operations (including the transferring of 
resources within the group), these operations would be put under the attention of an 
independent professional to establish if they are necessary to continue corporate activities 
and also to evaluate their coherence with the objective of the best possible satisfaction of 
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creditors of all corporations involved, and (of course) the latter’s approval.
75
 
Finally, the CCII demonstrates that it is aware of the fundamental multifaceted nature of 
corporate groups. This aspect is addressed with a flexible answer. In fact, already the 
trans-typical Italian legal discipline on direction and coordination has been positively 
received, being considered a reference point for the European Action Plan, which stresses a 
certain need to introduce an appropriate legal discipline of group interest. 
Given the occasion, it is also possible to reflect on certain complementary aspects, such 
as a more in-depth focus on the theme of group structure; the importance of information; 
the configuration of a group interest; and a perfecting of the criterion of “compensational 
advantages.”
76
 In this sense, the Italian model presents strong traits of originality both 
because of its trans-typical nature and because of its foundation on general principles and 
clauses. These set forth rules of behavior, which can adapt themselves to the variable 
structures of groups, present less rigidity, and lend themselves to legal harmonization.
77
 
This and other peculiarities that have been highlighted seem better suited to new legal 
categories and more adapted to economic reality and the legal regulation of a group, which 
seems ever more a sole entity, as what emerges from the discipline of group insolvency 
because of the complexity and heterogeneity of the phenomenon. 
From this prospective, in the end, the Italian model for regulating economic crisis with a 
corporate group offers an adequate answer to the need of flexibility, which mirrors the 
multifaceted nature of a corporate group, in order to effectively solve a crisis. Early 




Laying down a unitary discipline of the phenomenon with the aim of regulating 
liquidation or renovation of the company and its outstanding debts means pursuing the 
highest level of coordination within a system based on the principle of separation of assets 
(which at present seems insurmountable) in order to protect creditors. But conserving and 
placing on the same level the possibility to access insolvency procedures for single 
corporations means that high standard of flexibility that the varied nature of the group 
imposes is guaranteed. 
                                                      
75 It is expected that the negative effects of such operations can be contested by the creditors, by the 
dissenting creditors (belonging to the appropriate class of dissenters), or, in the absence of the formation of 
classes among creditors, those creditors that represent 20% of the credits admitted to vote in a single 
corporation, via the homologation of an insolvency agreement. The creditors that do not adhere may oppose 
the approval of any restricting agreements in court. 
76 Paolo Montalenti, Il diritto societario a dieci anni dalla riforma: bilanci, prospettive, proposte di 
restyling (Corporate Law of Ten Years after the Reform: Considerations, Perspectives and Restyling 
Proposals), 5 Giurisprudenza commerciale (Commercial Jurisprudence), 1077 (2014). 
77 On the importance of general clauses for the reconstruction of the legal discipline see Montalenti, fn. 
43 at 779.  
78 Cf. Scognamiglio, fn. 1. 
